Abstract We investigated the spontaneous brain electric activity of 13 skeptics and 16 believers in paranormal phenomena; they were university students assessed with a self-report scale about paranormal beliefs. 33-channel EEG recordings during no-task resting were processed as sequences of momentary potential distribution maps. Based on the maps at peak times of Global Field Power, the sequences were parsed into segments of quasi-stable potential distribution, the 'microstates'. The microstates were clustered into four classes of map topographies (A-D). Analysis of the microstate parameters time coverage, occurrence frequency and duration as well as the temporal sequence (syntax) of the microstate classes revealed significant differences: Believers had a higher coverage and occurrence of class B, tended to decreased coverage and occurrence of class C, and showed a predominant sequence of microstate concatenations from A to C to B to A that was reversed in skeptics (A to B to C to A). Microstates of different topographies, putative ''atoms of thought'', are hypothesized to represent different types of information processing.The study demonstrates that personality differences can be detected in resting EEG microstate parameters and microstate syntax. Microstate analysis yielded no conclusive evidence for the hypothesized relation between paranormal belief and schizophrenia.
Introduction
The functional state of the brain changes continually, even if there are no stimuli or tasks. The brain's processing of a given, external or internal information depends on the momentary functional state. Brain state can be monitored by electroencephalography (EEG) at the split-second speed needed for successful interaction with the surround.
Multichannel EEG displayed as sequence of momentary potential topographies (maps) shows quasi-stable configurations (mean duration of about 100 ms for spontaneous EEG) called functional microstates (Lehmann et al. 1987) that are concatenated by rapid transitions. Different microstates have been attributed to different types of cognitive processes (Britz et al. 2009; Lehmann et al. 1998 Lehmann et al. , 2010 Mohr et al. 2005; Müller et al. 2005) qualifying them for ''atoms of thought'' (Lehmann et al. 2010) . Microstate topographies during no-task resting can be clustered into four map configurations that explain[80% of the total data variance (Koenig et al. 2002) . These four classes have been observed in independent studies with notable similarity across subjects (Koenig et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005) . Microstate parameters (duration, frequency of occurrence) of the four classes differ between schizophrenics and controls (Irisawa et al. 2006; Kikuchi et al. 2007; Koenig et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005) . The temporal concatenation of microstates ('syntax') showed non-random behavior in healthy participants (Wackermann et al. 1993) . Also, microstate syntax exhibited a particular, deviant pattern in untreated schizophrenics compared to controls . Thus, the syntax of microstates may reflect personal cognitive strategies.
The EEG microstate concept was supported by fMRI studies where the time courses of microstates when convoluted with the hemodynamic response allowed to predict the BOLD signatures of resting-state networks ('RSNs') Musso et al. 2010 ) which display slower spontaneous fluctuations (about 10 s for no-task conditions) of the coherences of the BOLD response (Mantini et al. 2007 ); microstates were thus suggested to represent the underlying electrophysiological basis of RSNs. This is due to the monofractal, scale-free dynamics of microstate sequences, i.e., the information contained in the temporal dynamics of microstates is preserved over large timescales .
Inspired by the universality of EEG microstates, we wondered whether personality features of healthy people were also reflected in the parameters and syntax of microstates.
Using a previously obtained dataset (Pizzagalli et al. 2000) , we examined microstates during spontaneous awake no-task resting EEG of participants who differ in their belief in paranormal phenomena.
Materials and Methods
352 university students answered a questionnaire (4-point scale) about belief in and experience of paranormal phenomena (Mischo et al. 1993) . 117 agreed to participate in a subsequent EEG recording. Because 91 of the volunteers were women, men were excluded from the further assessment to avoid gender as a confounding factor. The questionnaire consists of 6 items, concerning mainly telepathy and precognition, and results in a score from 0 (strong skepticism) to 18 (strong belief in paranormal phenomena). Volunteers in the upper and lower 33% of the paranormal belief scale were accepted if right-handed, and native German speakers without personal or family history of psychiatric disorders. 19 'believers' and 18 'skeptics' remained for recordings. Eight persons with \10 s artifactfree EEG had to be excluded, leaving 16 believers (score range 15-18) and 13 skeptics (score range 0-6) for analysis. The two groups of participants did not differ in age, handedness and education level.
The study protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee. Participants gave their written consent and were financially compensated.
Thirty-five EEG electrodes referenced to Cz were attached according to the 10-10 system (Chatrian et al. 1988 ). Electrodes at the outer left and right canthus and infraorbital monitored eye movements. Participants were comfortably seated in a sound-and light-shielded recording chamber. They were told that the recording will be done during no Eye movement artifacts were removed using ICA (BrainVision Analyzer 2.0, Brain Products, Munich, Germany), followed by careful manual screening for other artifacts using most conservative criteria. No further artifact correction was done (not even interpolating single time frames), but all artifact time frames were omitted. Channels O9 and O10 were removed because of frequent muscle artifacts in most participants, leaving 33 channels. The data were eventually segmented into artifact-free 2 s epochs and digitally band passed to 2-20 Hz. Across participants, on average there was 27.7 ± 8.0 s (25.9 ± 8.4 s) for believers (skeptics) of 33-channel artifact-free eyes-closed EEG.
For microstate analysis (Koenig et al. 2002; Lehmann et al. 1987 Lehmann et al. , 2005 , all momentary (potential distribution) maps at peak times of global field power (GFP) (Lehmann and Skrandies 1980) after normalization to GFP = 1 were clustered into four map topographies using k-means clustering (Pascual-Marqui et al. 1995) . Across participants, the topographies of the four microstate classes explained 84.0 ± 5.1% of the total variance. The four map topographies of each participant were labeled according to the best fit microstate topography of classes A, B, C, D in a normative study (Koenig et al. 2002) . The four labeled individual microstate maps of each participant were used to label the sequential momentary maps at peak times of GFP, resulting in time sequences of the four microstate classes.
An average map was computed for each microstate class for each participant. Separately for the two participant groups, an average map for each of the four microstate classes was computed across participants. The microstate map topographies were tested for global differences of the spatial potential distributions between groups using TANOVA ). The program calculates Global Map Dissimilarity (Lehmann and Skrandies 1980) as measure of the global difference between two map topographies and establishes the exact probability of the observed difference using a randomization procedure. Channel-wise t-tests specified the spatial distributions of the differences.
The three microstate parameters of mean duration, frequency of occurrence per second, and percentage of occupied total analysis time ('coverage') were computed for each of the four microstate classes of each participant.
In addition, the frequency of GFP peaks per second was established for each microstate class and all participants.
Since microstate parameters were calculated for each 2 s epoch separately, the duration of the microstate at the beginning and the end of an epoch were truncated, on average by 50%. We corrected the microstate mean durations by applying Eq. 1 (provided by Thomas Koenig) to the durations of each microstate class of each participant:
where duration corrected is the corrected mean duration of the microstates of class X, duration observed is the computed mean duration of the microstates of class X, occurrence is the number of occurrences of microstates of class X observed during the analyzed time epoch, and coverage is the fraction of time of the analyzed epoch covered by the microstates of class X. The three microstate parameters were assessed using ANOVAs with group (believers, skeptics) as betweensubject factor and microstate class (A, B, C, D) as withinsubject factor.
The concatenation of the microstate classes over time ('microstate syntax') was examined as follows: The number of transitions from each of the four microstate classes to any other class (12 possibilities given the two directions of the six possible pairings of microstates), normalized by the total amount of microstate class transitions (X ? Y for X = Y) was obtained for each participant. In this way, the 12 possible microstate transitions were assessed as microstate transition percentages. To examine directional asymmetries in the transitions ('directional predominance') between the six possible microstate pairs, directional predominance X$Y was calculated as difference of the two transition percentages between two given microstate clas-
To assess the transition probabilities, ANOVAs were computed with group as between-subject factor and microstate pairing (six possibilities) as within-subject factor.
In case of statistically interesting results, correlations with the paranormal belief score were computed. Figure 1a shows the four averaged microstate map topographies for believers and for skeptics. The topographies of the obtained classes A, B, C and D resemble the topographies of previous studies (Koenig et al. 1999 (Koenig et al. , 2002 . The spatial distributions of the corresponding standard errors are displayed in Fig. 1b (note that isopotential lines are in steps of 1.0 units in Fig. 1a , of 0.1 units in Fig. 1b) . Figure 1c displays the t-values of the channel-wise t-tests between the map topographies of the two groups. TANOVA showed that the map topographies differed significantly between groups for microstate A (P \ 0.001), B (P = 0.003), and C (P = 0.002) but not for microstate D. TANOVA showed that within both groups, all four microstate map topographies differed significantly from each other (P-values between P \ 0.01 and P \ 0.00001).
Results
Viewed as channel-wise t-value topographies, in microstates class A, believers showed higher values right posterior (t(max) = 4.32), skeptics left lateral (t(max) = -4.22). For class B, believers had higher values right anterior (t(max) = 3.73), skeptics left posterior (t(max) = -3.44). For class C, believers had higher values in the periphery (t(max) = 3.74), skeptics in central areas (t(max) = -3.81). For class D, believers had higher values central right (t(max) = 1.51), skeptics in central-posterior left (t(max) = -2.03).
For the three microstate parameters duration, occurrence and coverage, a 2-factor ANOVA (group 9 microstate) revealed no main effect of group but significant group by microstate interactions for occurrence [F(3, 81) = 4.27; Fig. 1 The four microstate classes A-D in believers (Bel) and skeptics (Ske). a Mean potential distribution maps of the microstate classes of believers and skeptics, normalized for equal field power. Red and blue are the arbitrarily chosen color labels for areas of opposite polarity; isopotential lines in steps of 1.0 units. b Spatial distribution of standard errors of the mean; isopotential lines in steps of 0.1 units. c Topography of the t-values of channel-wise t-tests of differences between the potential distributions in believers and skeptics; red: believers higher potential than skeptics, blue: skeptics higher potential than believers. Iso-t-value lines in steps of t = 1. Head seen from above (nose up, left ear left) (Color figure online) P = 0.007] and coverage [F(3.81) = 2.91; P = 0.039]. Post-hoc comparisons (Table 1) revealed that microstate class B showed significant increases of occurrence and coverage in believers compared to skeptics (P = 0.044 and P = 0.023, respectively), and revealed that microstate class C showed a tendency to decreases of occurrence and coverage in believers (P = 0.093 and P = 0.064, respectively).
For class B, paranormal belief score correlated with coverage (r = 0.43, N = 29, P = 0.019) and showed a tendency to correlate with occurrence (r = 0.36, N = 29, P = 0.053) but showed no correlation with duration. For class C, paranormal belief score showed tendencies to correlate negative with coverage and occurrence (r = -0.34, N = 29, P = 0.070 and r = -0.35, N = 29, P = 0.066, respectively).
The mean frequency of GFP peaks per second across all participants decreased from microstate class A (21.44 ± 0.21 SE) to B (21.17 ± 0.22 SE) to C (20.89 ± 0.22 SE) to D (20.80 ± 0.21 SE). GFP peaks frequency of class A differed from that of classes B, C and D at P = 0.07, P = 0.0002, and P = 0.000001, respectively; that of class B differed from C and D at P = 0.06 and P = 0.01, respectively, while GFP peaks frequency did not differ significantly between classes C and D. The results were similar in believers and skeptics when separately examined.
For the directional predominances within the microstate syntax, a 2-factor ANOVA (group 9 microstate pair) revealed a significant interaction of group by microstate pair [F(5.135) = 3.31; P = 0.007]. Post-hoc analysis showed that believers differed significantly in their directional predominances for the microstate pairs A$B, A$C and B$C (Table 2; Fig. 2 ).
This result is accounted for by the reversed directions of directional predominance for believers and skeptics as illustrated in Fig. 2 which shows that the microstate pairs A$B, A$C and B$C constitute a quadruplet sequence A to C to B to A in believers and an A to B to C to A quadruplet sequence in skeptics. tended to have a higher preference for left quadruplets than skeptics (0.67 ± 1.65% vs. -0.29 ± 0.66%; t = 1.97; df = 27; P = 0.059).
Discussion
The microstate features reflected the personality difference between believers and skeptics. Rapid spontaneous reorganization of large-scale neuronal activity, characterized by the EEG microstates, represents the brain's ability to flexibly react to and integrate various incoming information. Hence, deviations in the tuning of the spontaneous microstate parameters reflect differences in the cognitive style and thus different dispositions to interpret the environment, here expressed as belief in and skepticism of paranormal phenomena.
Microstates of class B in believers compared to skeptics showed increased occurrence; because there was no difference in duration, an increase in time coverage resulted. Class B microstates have been associated with concrete/ visual imagery-type thoughts as opposed to microstate class A which has been associated with abstract thoughts (Lehmann et al. 1998 (Lehmann et al. , 2010 . Microstate class B has been correlated with negative BOLD signals in posterior occipital regions that are dedicated to visual processing ). The same network had previously been identified as RSN 3 by Mantini et al. (2007) . Thus, the present result suggests that believers tend to spend more time with thoughts of the concrete/visual imagery-type than skeptics.
On the other hand, microstates of class C in believers compared to skeptics showed a tendency to decreased occurrence that, in the absence of a difference in duration, resulted in decreased time coverage. Microstate class C has been correlated with positive BOLD signals in the ACC, bilateral inferior frontal gyri as well as right insula comparable to the regions of RSN 6 in Mantini et al. (2007) . Class C microstates have been suggested to involve processing with reduced attention (Brandeis and Lehmann 1989; Koenig et al. 1999) ; this would suggest that believers tend to spend less time in reduced attention than skeptics.
We note that microstate classes A and B because of their higher GFP peaks frequencies imply higher neural activation levels, i.e. higher global excitation than the microstates of classes C and D.
Since a given microstate is co-determined by its preceding microstate, one could speculate on inferences of the successive steps of cognitive processes based on the microstate syntax: In believers, a concrete thought (class B) is followed by abstraction (class A) which in turn leads to decreased attention with decreased excitation (class C), while in skeptics, an abstract thought (class A) is followed by concretization (class B) which in turn leads to decreased attention with decreased excitation (class C). Vice versa, decreased attention is followed by a concrete thought in believers and by an abstract thought in skeptics. Certainly, more research is needed to corroborate such speculative interpretations in view of the very limited knowledge on functional significance of the microstate classes. Microstate classes A, B, and C differed significantly in topography between believers and skeptics. It is obvious that humans have more than four different types of thought, even though the number of different thought types most likely is quite limited. Our analysis forced all maps into the four standard microstate classes that were repeatedly reported as reviewed in the introduction. Hence, a given microstate class in a given individual will consist of different topographies. In general, a given microstate class must be assumed to encompass a relatively large repertoire of related processing strategies. Differences between groups in the composition of the repertoire of processing strategies of a given class will be detectable as topographic differences of microstates.
Even though the topography of a microstate class might differ to some extent between participant groups, this would not imply a fundamental difference because the class designation was imposed by the class template that optimized the assignment ensuring maximal difference to the other classes (as a consequence, the topographies of the four microstate classes differed significantly from each other). But, for the same reason, the microstate classes must imply fundamental differences in brain activity. Most importantly, the topographies assigned to their microstate classes behave in the same fashion, irrespective to individual differences, i.e., they are anticorrelated to all the other classes. As it has been well established in schizophrenia studies, the microstate parameters reveal reliable and consistent group differences across a large diversity of participants, in spite of the variety of contributing map topographies.
Microstate classes A and B displayed a significantly stronger right-hemispheric activity in believers compared to skeptics. This reflects the finding in the earlier wave frequency-oriented analysis of the same data by Pizzagalli et al. (2000) where believers compared to skeptics showed a right-shifted gravity center of brain activity in the beta-2 frequency band, confirming a hypothesized right-hemispheric functional predominance in people with tendencies to paranormal ideation (Brugger and Graves 1997; Leonhard and Brugger 1998; Pizzagalli et al. 2001) .
We note that the analysis approaches of the present study and that of Pizzagalli et al. (2000) are completely different: The present analysis classifies each momentary time frame according to its topography and thereby distinguishes time epochs with different topographies. This detects changes of the functional state of the brain at a very high time resolution. Frequency decomposition is not part of the approach. On the other hand, the Fourier transformation and decomposition into 'wave' frequencies (or frequency bands) convolutes the data over time and therefore yields results that refer to the entire analyzed data. Because the two approaches examine the data from completely different viewpoints, their results will detect different aspects and thereby complement each other.
Relating paranormal belief as one of the features of schizotypal personalities to increased risk for schizophrenia (Eckblad and Chapman 1983; Meehl 1962) leads to the question whether the present results support a relation between brain mechanisms of paranormal belief and those of schizophrenia. Electrophysiological relations between schizotypy and paranormal belief have been discussed (Pizzagalli et al. 2000) . However, the principal deviations of microstate parameters in schizophrenia (Irisawa et al. 2007; Kikuchi et al. 2007; Koenig et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005; Strelets et al. 2003) , i.e., decreased duration of classes B and D and increased occurrence of A and C were not observed in the believers. In fact, believers showed an opposing result, decreased occurrence of C. Increased occurrence of B as seen in believers had been reported only in one schizophrenia study (Kikuchi et al. 2007 ). The scale-free dynamics of microstates (see introduction) have been shown to depend on microstate duration , the prominently deviant parameter in schizophrenia. Since our groups did not differ in microstate durations, this would suggest that the results represent short-term dependencies that may not be visible in fMRI, i.e., after strong temporal low-pass filtering. Microstate syntax fundamentally differed between the present study and findings in schizophrenia: While believers and skeptics showed inverted sequencing between microstate classes A, B, and C, schizophrenics and normals showed inverted sequencing between microstate classes A, C, and D . In sum, the present EEG microstate analysis showed very little support for electrophysiological similarities between paranormal beliefs and schizophrenia; this would agree with the notion that paranormal belief may exist without tendencies to psychosis (Goulding 2004; McCreery and Claridge 2002) .
